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WAIVER OF DISCHARGE IN SUBSEQUENT PROCEED-
ING
In a 1931 bankruptcy proceeding a bankrupt was dis-
charged of all debts. In 1934 one of the creditors filed suit
in an Oregon state court to recover on a claim, alleging that
after the bankrupt had filed his petition and prior to his
discharge he had expressly promised to pay the debt and
had made payments on it both before and after discharge. The
bankrupt set up his discharge in bankruptcy as a defense.
Judgment in the state court was rendered for the creditor.
In 1941 the bankrupt filed a second bankruptcy petition and
listed the 1934 judgment as his only unsecured debt. The
referee granted a qualified discharge, excepting therefrom
the judgment debt. The District Court sustained the referee,
holding that a bankrupt who waives his discharge by ptom",
ising to pay a discharged debt is forever barred from a later
discharge in bankruptcy of the same debt.1 The Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed: a new debt based upon moral considera-
tion was created by the promise to pay the old discharged
debt. This new debt was dischargeable. Shepherd v. McDon-
ald, 157 F.2d 467 (C.C.A. 9th 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S.
802 (1947).
The principal case raises the question whether a judg-
ment debt based upon a bankrupt's promise to pay a debt
which had been discharged in bankruptcy is itself discharge-
able in a later bankruptcy proceeding. It must be kept in
mind that the debt sought to be discharged in the second pro-
ceeding was a judgment debt, and that in considering the
validity of a judgment courts will not inquire into the under-
lying transaction out of which the judgment was rendered."
The solution of the question depends upon the interpretation
of the Bankruptcy Act.8
1. In re Shepherd, 61 F.Supp. 948 (D.C.Ore. 1945); Notes, 32 Va.
L. Rev. 642 (1946), 46 Col. L. Rev. 293 (1946).
2. See Moore v. Kraft, 179 Fed. 685, 686 (1910): "But when Moore
. . obtained the judgment in question, the original cause of
action became merged in the legal evidence of a new debt, for
the nonpayment of which a new cause of action would arise." Ac-
cord, McAleer v. Clay County, 38 Fed. 707 (N.D.Iowa 1889).
3. 30 Stat. 544 (1898), as amended, 52 Stat. 840 (1938), 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1 et seq. (1940).
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In considering any petition in bankruptcy, three prob-
lems may confront a court as to whether a debt is discharge-
able. These will be presented and discussed in relation to
the principal case.
1. Whether the claims made are debts "provable in
bankrupty." This problem is solved in the principal case by
§63 (a) (1) of the Bankruptcy Act, in which a judgment is
specifically made a "provable debt" within the meaning of
§1(14) which defines "debt" as being any debt provable in
bankruptcy. Nothing in the Act nor in its legislative history4
makes an exception to judgments being provable debts.
2. Whether the debts are within the exceptions of §17
and are therefore not dischargeable. This problem seems
clearly answered by §17(a) of the Bankruptcy Act which
lists the six statutory exceptions as the debts "not affected
by a discharge." These exceptions do not include a judg-
ment based upon a new promise to pay an obligation dis-
charged by a prior bankruptcy. It has been held that §17
must be strictly construed in favor of the bankrupt.6
3. Whether, if the debts are not within the exceptions
of §17, they are excepted for any other reason. As to this
problem, the contention made by the creditor in the principal
case was that the bankrupt's waiver of his discharge in the
first bankruptcy proceeding operated as a bar to his discharge
of the same obligation in a second bankruptcy proceeding.
Perhaps the best answer to this contention is that the obliga-
tions sought to be discharged in the two proceedings were not
the same. In the first, the discharged debts were founded up-
on certain promissory notes. In the second, the debt was
founded upon a judgment of a state court.
However, the creditor's contention may also be success-
fully controverted by a construction of the Bankruptcy Act's
4. H. R. Rep. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
5. Section 17(a) lists the following six exceptions:
1. taxes due;
2. alimony, child support, and liabilities arising from certain torts;
3. debts not duly scheduled in time for proof and allowance;
4. debts arising from petitioner's misappropriations while acting
in a fiduciary capacity;
5. wages earned within three months before commencement of
the bankruptcy proceedings; and
6. deposits to secure faithful performance by an employee of the
terms of an employment contract.
6. Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558 (1914); Lockhart v. Edel, 23 F.2d
912 (C.C.A. 4th 1928).
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waiver provisions. Section 14 (a) contains the only procedure
by which a bankrupt may waive his discharge. It provides
that an adjudication of bankruptcy will not operate as a dis-
charge if the bankrupt, before the hearing on his application
for a discharge, waives, by writing filed with the court, his
right to a discharge7 Concededly the bankrupt in the prin-
cipal case did not comply with the waiver provisions in
the Act. Therefore to deny his discharge in the subsequent
bankruptcy proceeding would be judicial legislation, i.e., add-
ing a seventh exception to the six listed in §17.
The District Court, in holding that the original debt was
revived by means of a waiver, considered the principal case
analogous to those cases which hold that where a bankrupt
loses his right to a discharge by a failure to prosecute, he
cannot in a later proceeding secure a discharge of the debits
scheduled in the prior proceeding.8 The judgment in the
first proceeding would be res judicata as to all claims sched-
uled therein. 9 Therefore, whether or not the doctrine of res
judicata has any application to the. facts of the principal
case depends upon whether the judgment sought to be dis-
charged in the second proceeding ,and the promissiory. note
discharged in the first proceeding were the same debt. It is
submitted that they were not the same debt, either under the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act,10 or under the various
theories of waiver which obtain in the state courts. 1
7. 1 Collier, "Bankruptcy" (14th ed. 1940) § 17.33; 7 Remington,
"Bankruptcy" (5th ed. 1939) § 3502. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898
(30 Stat. 544), under which the 1931 discharge in the principal
case was granted, contained no provision for waiver of discharge.
The Chandler Act, supra n. 3, in 1938 amended the Act of 1898,
supplying the waiver provisions.
8. Hill v. Railroad Industrial Finance Co., 92 F.2d 973 (C.C.A. 10th
1937); Pollet v. Cosel, 179 Fed. 488 (C.C.A. 1st 1910); Kuntz v.
Young, 131 Fed. 719 (C.C.A. 8th 1904).
9. In re Fiegenbaum, 121 Fed. 69 (C.C.A. 2d 1903).
10. 52 Stat. 873 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 103 (a) (1940).
11. The Circuit Court's decision that the new debt is based on the
debtor's moral obligation to pay after discharge has been attacked
by a leading writer. 1 Collier, "Bankruptcy" (Supp. 1946) §§
17.33, 17.38. More recent authority holds that promises to pay
once .legally enforceable debts such as those barred by a discharge
in bankruptcy are enforceable without consideration. 1 Williston,
"Contracts" §§ 147, 158 (Rev. ed. 1936); Restatement, "Contracts"
§ 85 (1932). However, contrary to this position are numerous
cases holding that while a discharge releases a bankrupt from
legal liability to pay a provable debt, it leaves him under a moral
duty which is sufficient to support a new promise to pay. Zavelo
v. Reeves, 227 U.S. 625 (1913); In re Cox, 33 F.Supp, 796 (W.D.Ky.
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Moreover, even if the two debts could be reasonably held
identical, the correct application of the doctrine of res judi-
cata would seem to require a result exactly contra to that
reached by the District Court. For, if the 1934 judgment
of the state court was based upon the original debt that had
been discharged in the first bankruptcy proceeding, then the
doctrine of res judicata would require such judgment to be
held dischargeable in the second proceeding.12 Obviously,
a denial of the discharge of a debt in a prior bankruptcy pro-
ceeding is res judicata that such debt is within the excep-
tions of §17. Therefore, a discharge of a debt in a prior bank-
ruptcy proceeding is res judicata that such debt is not within
the exceptions of §17 and is dischargeable.
The Circuit Court of Appeals reached the correct result,
although the Court was somewhat confused in its legal reason-
ing. The Court laid great emphasis on the creditor's allega-
tion that the bankrupt's new promise was made after dis-
charge, notwithstanding that it is overwhelmingly settled
that whether the promise is made before or after discharge is
immaterial.13 Collier approves the District Court's decision,
on grounds that the waiver did not create a new debt, but
merely renewed the old one, and that the judgment merely
changed the form of the original debt.14 The essence of the
Circuit Court's opinion was that the bankrupt was an "honest
debtor" as demonstrated by his "recognition of his moral
obligation to pay his discharged indebtedness"; and that as
1940); Needham v. Matthewson, 81 Kan. 340, 105 Pac. 436 (1909).
The majority of cases likewise hold that a discharge in bankruptcy
merely affords a complete legal defense to a claim without ex-
tinguishing the debt itself. In re Weisburg, 253 Fed. 833 (E.D.Mich.
1918); Butler Bros. v. Twineham, 134 Kan. 547, 7 P.2d 531 (1932);
Federal National Bank v. Koppel, 253 Mass. 157, 148 N.E. 379
(1925) ; contra: Needham v. Matthewson, 81 Kan. 340, 105 Pac.
436 (1909); Kravitz v. Povlotsky, 335 Pa. 7/5, 3 A.2d 922 (1939).
It is generally agreed that the bankrupt may waive this defense.
Hays v. Cyrus, 252 Ky. 435, 67 S.W.2d 503 (1934); Harrington v.
Davitt, 220 N.Y. 162, 115 N.E. 476 (1917). However, the courts
are in conflict as to whether the cause of action should be brought
on the original obligation supported by a new promise: Fierce v.
Fleming, 205 Iowa 1281, 217 N.W. 806 (1928); Parker v. Smith,
143 Wash. 677, 255 Pac. 1026 (1927); or on the new promise
supported by the older liability: Needham v. Matthewson, 81
Kan. 340, 105 Pac. 436 (1909); McDermott v. Sulkin, 154 Pa.
Super. 81, 35 A.2d 556 (1944).
12. Shepherd v. McDonald, 157 F.2d 467, 469 (C.C-A. 9th 1946), cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 802 (1947).




a matter of policy to refuse a discharge would penalize the
bankrupt and prevent him from starting afresh, from his
business misfortunes. It is true that one of the avowed pur-
poses of the Bankruptcy Act is to discharge the indebtedness
of the honest debtor so that he will be permitted to start
afresh in his economic pursuits.15  Courts have held that the
Act is to be sensibly construed in favor of the honest bank-
rupt and his release.16 However, it is submitted that the
result reached by the Circuit Court in the principal case is
the only tenable interpretation under the Bankruptcy Act,
wholly apart from matters of policy.
CONFLICT OF LAWS
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
An employee of an Illinois Corporation, hired in Illinois,
was injured in the course of his employment in Wisconsin.
The employee received a Workmen's Compensation award
from his employer under the Illinois statute. This award
contained a specific provision that no rights were to be af-
fected which the employee might have under the Workmen's
Compensation Act of Wisconsin. Then the employee applied
for compensation under the Wisconsin Act. The Wisconsi
Supreme Court' under the authority of Magnolia Petroleum
Co. v Hunts set aside the Wisconsin order allowing compen-
sation, finding that under the full faith and credit clauses
of the Federal Constitution that the Wisconsin proceedings
were barred by the Illinois awad. On certiorari to the Su-
preme Court the Wisconsin judgment was reversed; since the
Illinois award was not intended to be conclusive of the em-
ployee's rights in Wisconsin, the Wisconsin award was not
barred by the Illinois award. Industrial Commission of Wis-
consin v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947).
The requirement of the Constitution for one state to
15. H. R. Rep. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1937).
16. Williams v. U.S. Fidelity Co., 236 U.S. 549 (1915).
1. 248 Wis. 570, 22 N.W.2d 522 (1946).
2. 320 U.S. 430, 150 A.L.R. 413 (1943).
3. U.S. Const. Art. IV, §1: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in
each state to the Public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings
of every State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe
the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be
proved, and Effect thereof."
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